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Abstract 
The essay opens with some background information about the period in which JS Mill 
wrote. The discussion revolves around the concept of blasphemy which Mill considered 
to be highly problematic. Tagging unpopular views as “blasphemous” amounted to abuse 
of governmental powers and infringed on the basic liberties of the out-of-favour speakers. 
The discussion on blasphemy sets the scene to the understanding of Mill’s concerns, 
his priorities and consequently his emphasis on the widest possible liberty of 
expression. Section II presents the Millian principles that are pertinent to his philosophy 
of free speech: liberty and truth. Section III analyzes Mill’s very limited boundaries to 
freedom of expression, asserting that the consequentialist reasoning had led Mill to 
ignore present tangible harm. It is argued that democracy is required to develop 
protective mechanisms against harm-facilitating speech. 
 
                                                 
1 I thank Richard Oliver Colin, Herb Morris, Alex Tsesis, Clare McGlynn, Steve Darwall, Eric Barendt, 
Kath Gelber, Wayne Sumner, and Nick Zangwill for their sharp and constructive comments. The article is 
dedicated to the memory of Geoffrey Marshall with whom I had many hours of deliberations on the 
scholarship and influence of JS Mill. I cannot think of a better teacher. 
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JS Mill’s Boundaries of Freedom of Expression: A Critique 
Introduction 
John Stuart Mill was one of the most important liberal political philosophers of the 19th 
Century. In my previous article, I criticized his elastic paternalism designed to prevent 
people from inflicting harm upon others as well as upon themselves, from soft paternalism 
on issues like compulsory education to hard paternalism on very private matters such as 
marriage, having children, and divorce by consent.2 The aim of this article is to offer a 
comprehensive critique of his limited discussion on free speech limitations as presented 
in On Liberty. By his own account, On Liberty (1859) was his most salient text. In his 
Autobiography, Mill wrote about On Liberty: “None of my writings have been either so 
carefully composed or so sedulously corrected as this.”3 This book is designed to 
celebrate individuality and freedom. However Mill hardly spoke about limitations to 
freedom of expression. In the entire book, there is only one paragraph and a single 
footnote (!) in which Mill explained what the boundaries should be. In both places, Mill 
was concerned with incitement. Clearly, Mill was far more interested in preaching 
freedom of expression than prescribing boundaries to it. The Millian consequential 
reasoning on the exclusion of incitement from the Free Speech Principle was adopted 
                                                 
2 R. Cohen-Almagor, ‘Between Autonomy and State Regulation: J.S. Mill’s Elastic Paternalism’, Philosophy 
87 (4) (October 2012), 557-582. 
3 J.S. Mill, Autobiography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 144. 
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by philosophers, political scientists and the courts across the democratic world.4 Mill 
had made strong contribution to making consequentialism fashionable. He has helped 
to form one of the most important theories in the history of moral philosophy. Indeed, 
Mill’s views on freedom of expression have granted him a place among the forefathers 
of liberal ideology. 
On Liberty has inspired the writing of many subsequent liberal philosophers. 
Freedom of expression deserves protection because it enhances individualism and 
public goods. Liberals concede that certain expressions might be very harmful yet argue 
that they should be protected not because of their inherent value but despite it; because 
the protection of such expressions promotes the virtue of tolerance;5 because it 
enhances individualism and personal autonomy;6 because it protects the dignity of the 
person;7 because it encourages toleration in other spheres and situations;8 because it 
                                                 
4 D.O. Brink, Mill’s Progressive Principles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); S.D. Smith, ‘Is the 
Harm Principle Liberal?’, American J. of Jurisprudence 51 (2006), 1-38; George Kateb, ‘The Freedom of 
Worthless and Harmful Speech’, in Bernard Yack (ed.), Liberalism without Illusions (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1996), chap. 15. 
5 Frederick Schauer, ‘Free Speech on Tuesdays’, Law and Philosophy 34 (2015), 119-40; Bican Sahin, 
Toleration: the liberal virtue (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010); Glen Newey, ‘Tolerance as a Virtue’, 
in John Horton and Susan Mendus (eds.), Toleration: Identity and Difference (London: Macmillan, 1999), 
38-64; David Heyd (ed.), Toleration: An Elusive Virtue (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
6 C.E. Baker, ‘Autonomy and Hate Speech’, in Ivan Hare and James Weinstein (eds.), Extreme Speech 
and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 139-157. 
7 William Ruger, ‘Free Speech Is Central to Our Dignity as Humans’, Time Magazine (3 June 2016), 
http://time.com/4355651/free-speech-human-dignity/ 
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fosters democracy;9 because it serves as a check on government,10 or because 
protecting freedom of expression is likely to bring more good than evil.11 John Stuart Mill 
did not devote much attention to defining the scope of tolerance toward the intolerant 
since his main concern was to promote the ideas of liberty and justice, not to 
circumscribe them.  
The essay explains the Millian free speech philosophy within the legal and social 
context of Victorian Britain. The concept of freedom of expression in 19th Century 
England was limited compared to our understanding of the concept in 21st Century 
England. Mill emphasizes the widest possible liberty of expression in his social context 
because public expression critical of existing social institutions was rigorously 
suppressed, as exemplified by harsh legal penalties against blasphemy of Christianity. 
                                                                                                                                                             
8 L.C. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). 
9 Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom (NY: Oxford University Press, 1965). 
10 Thomas Scanlon, ‘A Theory of Freedom of Expression’, in R.M. Dworkin (ed.), The Philosophy of Law 
(Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1977), 153-171; T.M. Scanlon, ‘Freedom of Expression and 
Categories of Expression’, University of Pittsburgh Law Review 40 (4) (Summer 1979), 519-550; T.M. 
Scanlon, ‘Content Regulation Reconsidered’, in Judith Lichtenberg (ed.), Democracy and the Mass Media 
(NY: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 331-39; Thomas Scanlon, The Difficulty of Tolerance 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Frederick Schauer, Free Speech (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982) and Schauer, ‘The Cost of Communicative Tolerance’, in R. Cohen-Almagor 
(ed.), Liberal Democracy and the Limits of Tolerance (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 28-
42.  
11 Jonathan Gilmore, ‘Expression as Realization: Speakers’ Interests in Freedom of Speech’, Law and 
Philosophy 30 (2011), 517-539. 
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Mill was against suppression of religious opinions and prayers as blasphemous, 
speaking about an indefeasible right to hold any religious views one likes and to engage 
in any prayers, short of injury to others. Mill set out his argument with a particular goal in 
mind, that of freeing public opinion in the context of Victorian Britain where access to 
public discussion was legally and economically restricted.  
The article succinctly presents the Millian principles that are pertinent to his 
philosophy on free speech: liberty and truth. While referring to different writings of Mill, 
the focus is on freedom of expression in On Liberty. Mill’s very limited boundaries to 
free expression are explained and scrutinized, arguing that the Millian consequentialist 
reasoning, which fears potential harmful consequences, may lead to ignore present 
tangible harm. It is argued that democracy requires governments to develop protective 
mechanisms against harm-facilitating speech. 
 
Freedom of Expression in 19th Century England 
The political culture of 19th Century England was significantly different from present day 
England in crucial political, economic and cultural respects relevant to our discussion. 
First, equality before the law left much to be desired. There was one law for the poor, 
another for the rich.12  
                                                 
12 Joss Marsh, Word Crimes (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1998); David Nash, 
Blasphemy in Modern Britain: 1789 to the present (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999). 
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Second, more than 25% of the population was living at or below subsistence 
level.13 Robert Owen wrote that the poor and working classes of Great Britain and 
Ireland exceeded fifteen millions of persons, or nearly three-fourths of the population of 
the British Islands.14  
Third, during the early decades of the century daily newspapers were mostly sold 
for seven pence or more, a prohibitive price well beyond the ability of the poor.15 The 
London Daily Telegraph broke new grounds in 1855 when it reduced its price to one 
penny. It reached an unprecedented circulation of 270,000. Shortly thereafter, other 
newspapers followed suit.16  
Fourth, the level of illiteracy was significantly high: 47% in 1820 and 24% in 1870 
(compared to 1% in 2003).17  
                                                 
13 Alan Kidd, State, Society and the Poor in 19th Century England (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 
1999); A.W. Ager, Crime and Poverty in 19th-Century England (London: Bloomsbury, 2014). 
14 Robert Owen, A New View of Society (1816), 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/economics/owen/ch01.htm 
15 The London Daily Telegraph broke new grounds in 1855 when it reduced its price to one penny. It 
reached an unprecedented circulation of 270,000. Shortly thereafter, other newspapers followed suit. J.H. 
Wiener, ‘The Nineteenth Century and the Emergence of A Mass Circulation Press’, in Martin Conboy and 
John Steel (eds.), The Routledge Companion to British Media History (London and New York: Routledge, 
2015), 206-14. 
16 Ibid., 208. See also Theophila Carlile Campbell, The Battle of the Press (London: A. & H.B. Bonner, 
1899), http://www.gutenberg.org/files/38370/38370-h/38370-h.htm 
17 Max Roser, ‘Literacy’, in Our World in Data (2014), http://www.ourworldindata.org/data/education-
knowledge/literacy/ [Online Resource]. Radical activists and movements surmounted this problem in 
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Fifth, freedoms of belief, of expression and of publication were qualified.18  
Sixth, the scope of tolerance was limited especially on matters of religion.19 In the 
1820s, Deists (belief in the existence of a God on the evidence of reason and nature 
only, with rejection of supernatural revelation) were prosecuted for casting doubt on 
scripture. Thus, for instance, in 1827 Robert Taylor was sentenced to one year in prison 
and to provide £1,000 in recognisances20 after he denounced Christianity as a 
“mischievous fable.”21 Radical journalists like Richard Carlile were prosecuted and 
imprisoned for publishing blasphemous newspapers and for reprinting Thomas Paine’s 
Age of Reason.22 Thomas Pain’s Age of Reason opposed tyrannical readings of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
working class communities by reading out aloud radical newspapers to 'illiterate' working class audiences. 
Radical activists would hold large open air meetings and practice their brand of free speech through these 
meetings. 
18 G.J. Holyoake, The Case of Thomas Pooley the Cornish Well Sinker (London: Holyoake and Co., 
1857), and Holyoake, The Co-operative Movement Today (London: Methuen, 1891). 
19 David Nash, Blasphemy in Modern Britain, and Nash, Blasphemy in the Christian World: A History 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
20 A bond by which a person undertakes before a court or magistrate to observe some condition, 
especially to appear when summoned. 
21 David Nash, Blasphemy in Modern Britain, 88-89; Deism—Oaths in Courts of Justice-Petition of Robert 
Taylor, HC Deb 29 November 1826, Vol 16, cc171-8, 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1826/nov/29/deism-oaths-in-courts-of-justice 
22 David Nash, ‘Blasphemy in Victorian Britain? Foote and the Freethinker’, History Today 45(10) 
(October 1995), 13-19, at 14. 
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Bible and condemned attempts to convert Jews, Muslims and Huguenots. Paine argued 
that large sections of the bible, including the creation story, were myths.23 
Blasphemy is defined as a contemptuous or profane act, utterance, or writing 
concerning God or a sacred entity.24 Lord Chief Justice Abbott said: “In this Court we 
assume that the Christian religion is true. I am anxious to give every possible latitude of 
defence, but I cannot permit the introduction of blasphemy; I cannot allow this day's 
proceedings to form a precedent that might be dangerous in future times”.25 
Religion remained a highly sensitive matter throughout the 19th Century and the 
Taylor case did not constitute enough deterrence to stop people from voicing anti-
conformist views. In the 1840s, the law on blasphemy was invoked to imprison people 
who uttered agnostic or critical remarks against the church.26 In 1841, Charles 
Southwell started a weekly atheistic publication, the Oracle of Reason and was shortly 
thereafter arrested for blasphemy. Southwell suggested that the Bible was not the 
product of God but the outpourings of some devil. He was convicted and sentenced to 
                                                 
23 David Nash, Blasphemy in Modern Britain,76-77. 
24 The Free Dictionary, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/blasphemies 
25 Theophila Carlile Campbell, The Battle of the Press. 
26 The Blasphemy Act 1697 (9 Will 3 c 35) was an Act of Parliament that made it an offence for any 
person, educated in or having made profession of the Christian religion, by writing, preaching, teaching or 
advised speaking, to deny the Holy Trinity, to claim there is more than one God, to deny the truth of 
Christianity and to deny the Bible as divine authority. See 
http://community.worldheritage.org/articles/Blasphemy_Act_1697 
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£100 fine and a year’s jail sentence.27 George Jacob Holyoake volunteered to edit the 
paper and was subsequently prosecuted for disseminating atheism. Holyoake was the 
founder of organized Secularism, and the first Chairman of the Rationalist Press 
Association. His crime was to say: “I do not believe there is such a thing as a God”.28 
He also implied that the salaries of clergymen should be reduced. His choice of words, 
deemed offensive, related to class concerns. Mr Justice Erskine said that Holyoake was 
“convicted of uttering language”.29 Two minutes of “his own words” cost Holyoake six 
months in Gloucester gaol. The court made it clear that poor men had no right to use 
their own words to express their own opinions.  
On release from prison, Holyoake formed The Movement journal, later re-
named The Reasoner, which became one of the most important periodicals of the 
nineteenth century, championing Chartist principles,30 political reform and the emerging 
                                                 
27 David Nash, Blasphemy in Modern Britain, 92-93. 
28 Joss Marsh, Word Crimes, 117. 
29 Ibid., 118. 
30 The Chartist movement was comprised of working-class people who campaigned for 
parliamentary reform. The name came from the People’s Charter, a bill drafted by William Lovett in May 
1838. It contained six demands: universal manhood suffrage, equal electoral districts, vote by ballot, 
annually elected Parliaments, payment of members of Parliament, and abolition of the property 
qualifications for membership. Chartism grew out of the protest against the injustices of the new industrial 
and political order in Britain. See Stephen Roberts, ‘The Chartist Movement 1838 – 1848’, BBC (20 June 
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/victorians/chartist_01.shtml, and UK Parliament, 
http://www.parliament.uk/about/living-
heritage/transformingsociety/electionsvoting/chartists/overview/chartistmovement/ 
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secularist movement. The Reasoner published reports on controversial cases, including 
a 32 page report on Thomas Pooley.31 The Pooley case is discussed below. 
 Against this background, J.S. Mill preached in On Liberty his liberal ideas for the 
widest possible freedom of expression and against governmental suppression of 
opinions.32 Mill was primarily concerned with the dissemination of religious, moral and 
political opinions. He did not address free speech topics that are very fashionable today, 
such as defamation, frivolous (and not so frivolous) gossip, or divulging sensitive 
security information. Mill argued that there is no certain and universal rule for 
                                                 
31 Henry Hetherington was indicted for publishing Haslam's Letters to the Clergy of all Denominations, 
whose arguments were directed against passages in the Old Testament which were deemed cruel and 
immoral. For this crime, Hetherington was imprisoned for four months. See Lesley Stephen and Sidney 
Lee (eds.), ‘Henry Hetherington (1792-1849), in Dictionary of National Biography (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1949), http://www.historyhome.co.uk/people/hetherin.htm . Hetherington was out of 
favour and targeted by the English elite because he refused to pay the press tax. At that time, every copy 
of a newspaper was required to be impressed with a four penny stamp. Hetherington believed that the 
working people needed knowledge and news, and he refused to pay for a tax that prevented them from 
acquiring information. For publishing The Poor Man’s Guardian without a stamp, Hetherington was 
imprisoned twice, each time for six months. See Literary Anecdotes, ‘Henry Hetherington (1792-1849)’, 
http://www.ourcivilisation.com/smartboard/shop/anecdtes/c19/hthrngtn.htm 
32 In Principles of Political Economy (New York: D. Appleton And Company, 1885), 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/30107/30107-pdf.pdf, esp. Book 2, Chapter 1, Mill advocated abolition of 
all exceptional laws, especially those relating to the press, public meetings, and associations; in short, of 
all laws which hinder the free expression of ideas and thought. At the same time, Mill did not believe that 
freedom of expression can be used as a justification or excuse for committing crimes. For further 
discussion of the period, see Jonathan Riley, Mill on Liberty (London: Routledge, 1998), 29-53. 
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determining whether an opinion is useful or pernicious, and that if one assumes such 
power to decide between the two, then that person is a despot. In the context of the 
time, those ideas were perceived to be radical.33 Mill was troubled by the prosecution of 
opinions and stood for the right of people like Carlile, Holyoake and Pooley to express 
their unconventional views.  
Mill believed that the justice system should render equal justice to the believer 
and to the unbeliever, to the rich and to the poor. He thought ideas should be judged by 
their content and their contribution to public debate, not by the manner they were 
uttered. The poor are not astute and articulate as the rich. Their manners are unrefined 
and crude. Mill (1883) thought it was unfair to judge the poor and the uneducated by the 
same standards applied to the privileged classes.34 Carlile’s language might have been 
“abusive” in the ears and minds of the refined yet it had a place and should have been 
heard. Mill fought against unjust laws that made speech a privilege for the privileged. 
Mill appreciated Holyoake’s work for the underprivileged. On many issues, Mill 
and Holyoake saw eye to eye, aiming to promote change in conservative English 
society. Holyoake fought for secular education, for the rights of the working classes, for 
                                                 
33 J.S. Mill, ‘Law and Libel and Liberty of the Press’, in Geraint L. Williams (ed.), John Stuart Mill on Politics 
and Society (Glasgow: Fontana, 1976), 143-169, at 148. 
34 John Stuart Mill, The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, XXV - Newspaper Writings December 1847 - 
July 1873 Part IV [1847], http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/mill-the-collected-works-of-john-stuart-mill-volume-
xxv-newspaper-writings-part-iv 
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the co-operative movement35 and for profit-sharing schemes, for the secret ballot and 
for international peace.36 He wanted recognition that his own words are equal to others 
and have the right to be heard. He wanted a voice, and Mill wanted to empower him, 
and others. Holyoake drew inspiration from Mill’s work The Principles of Political 
Economy (1848).37 Like Mill, Holyoake strove to find a path between socialism and 
capitalism. Mill regularly corresponded with Holyoake and provided him with intellectual 
support for many of his social campaigns for the rights of the working classes and for 
his own right to voice opinions without fear of public opinion or the law. 
 Mill’s On Liberty (1859) draws upon Holyoake’s experiences and struggles.  
Thomas Pooley’s trial became a cause celebre when Mill spoke for his right to voice an 
opinion on controversial issues. In On Liberty Mill wrote:  
It will be said, that we do not now put to death the introducers of new 
opinions; we are not like our fathers who slew the prophets... It is true we no 
longer put heretics to death... But let us not flatter ourselves that we are yet 
free from the stain even of legal persecution. Penalties for opinions, or at 
least for its expression, still exist by law; and their enforcement is not, even in 
                                                 
35 Holyoake (The Co-operative Movement Today) explained that the original object of co-operation was to 
establish self-supporting communities distinguished by common labour, common property, common 
means of intelligence and recreation. The aim was to create an ethical communal life for the working 
people. 
36 Edward Royle, ‘George Jacob Holyoake’, Journal of Liberal History, 67 (Summer 2010), 35-37. 
37 John Stuart Mill, The Principles of Political Economy (New York: D. Appleton And Company, 1885), 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/30107/30107-pdf.pdf 
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these times, so unexampled as to make it at all incredible that they may 
some day be revived in full force.38  
Mill then went on to describe the Pooley case: “In the year 1857, at the summer 
assizes of the county of Cornwall, an unfortunate man, said to be of unexceptionable 
conduct in all relations of life, was sentenced to twenty-one months’ imprisonment for 
uttering and writing on a gate some offensive words concerning Christianity”.39 Mill 
thought this was counter-productive, unjust and unfair. Pooley was entitled to advocate 
ideas. Mill called for change.40 
The Pooley trial was distinctly problematic and attracted wide attention. 
Controversies relating to freedom of expression, religion and class all came into the mix. 
Pooley was a feeble-minded, poor labourer who contested Christianity and stood 
against a highly biased court: the presiding judge, Sir John Taylor Coleridge, was the 
father of the prosecutor, John Duke Coleridge. Yet again, the courts held that freedom 
of expression existed only within the confines of Christianity and that they would not 
                                                 
38 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government (London: J. M. Dent, 1948), 
Everyman's edition, 90. 
39 Ibid. 
40 The United Kingdom abolished its laws against blasphemy in England and Wales in 2008 with the 
passage of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act. Section 79 abolished the common law offences 
of blasphemy and blasphemous libel in England and Wales. See 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/4/section/79 
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tolerate what they considered as blasphemy when uttered by poor people.41 The law 
was ill-defined, enabling the “great and the good” judges to put into bad effect their 
prejudices and tastes, making irrelevant considerations the main arbiters in the matters 
at hand.  
The common liberal interpretation of Mill is that any speech that falls under the 
category of advocacy is immune to restrictions. Only forms of instigation which bring 
about instant harm are punishable, and these cases constitute the exception to the free 
speech principle.42 I do not think Mill had religion in mind. On religion, Mill seemed to 
think that even if certain expressions are offensive to the dignity of the person, they still 
should be tolerated because of the utility they produce in enhancing freedom and the 
search for truth. 
  
                                                 
41 Surely the crime itself did not have as an element of the offense one's 
membership in one class or another, whatever the biases of the government 
officials might be. If Darwin, who was not, I believe, poor, had publicly, in Trafalgar Square, asserted that 
belief in a personal God was an infantile and an unwarranted belief, and that the idea of an everlasting life 
was unintelligible and merely offered as an opiate for the deluded poor of the world, then he could have 
faced blasphemy charges. Astute people were careful when formulating such ideas in public, not wishing 
to provoke the attention of the authorities or to test their tolerance. The point that I am making is that, in 
practice, blasphemy charges were made against people of a certain economic class and against 
journalists who identified with them. For further discussion, see Alan Cabantous, Blasphemy – Impious 
Speech in the West from the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth Century (NY: Columbia University Press, 
1998). 
42 R. Cohen-Almagor, Speech, Media, and Ethics (Houndmills and New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2005). 
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Mill’s Arguments for Freedom of Expression  
The Millian principles in support of freedom of expression are well versed in the literature. 
They were explored by many scholars43 thus here I assert them rather than argue or justify 
them, reflecting on their exposition in On Liberty as well as in other writings in order to set 
the scene for discussion on Mill’s boundaries of free expression. Two important principles 
guided Mill’s thinking on freedom of expression: Liberty and Truth. Mill regarded them as 
valid since they have passed, in his opinion, the utilitarian test: they are important because 
of their conduciveness to the Ultimate Principle of Utility. They are designed to bring 
happiness, to enrich the world with good, and to avoid evil. Insisting that "happiness is the 
sole end of human action,” Mill argued that "According to the Greatest Happiness 
Principle... the ultimate end... is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as 
rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality.”44  
 In formulating his Liberty Principle, Mill began by saying that the only freedom 
which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, "so long as we 
do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it" or, in other 
                                                 
43 John Skorupski, John Stuart Mill (London & New York: Routledge, 1989); John Gray, Mill on Liberty: A 
Defence. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1996); Raphael Cohen-Almagor, ‘Ends and Means in J.S. Mill’s 
Utilitarian Theory’, Anglo-American L. Rev. 26 (2) (1997), 141-74; Jonathan Riley, Mill on Liberty (London: 
Routledge, 1998); K.C. O’Rourke, John Stuart Mill and Freedom of Expression (London: Routledge, 
2001); Will Cartwright, ‘John Stuart Mill on Freedom of Discussion’, Richmond Journal of Philosophy 5 
(Autumn 2003), 1-7; J. Riley, ‘J.S. Mill’s Doctrine of Freedom of Expression’, Utilitas 17 (2) (July 2005): 
147-79; http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol22/iss1/2; Brink, Mill’s Progressive Principles. 
44 J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government, 6, 11, 36. 
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words, so long as we do not harm others.45 Acts of whatever kind, which without justifiable 
cause, do harm to others, may be, "and in the more important cases absolutely require to 
be", controlled by the "unfavourable sentiments, and, when needful, by the active 
interference of mankind".46 People should receive their proper share, that is, that part 
which concerns themselves: "[T]o individuality should belong the part of life in which it is 
chiefly the individual that is interested; to society, the part which chiefly interests society" 
(1948: 132), for "liberty consists in doing what one desires".47 
 Mill valued both the defensive (negative liberty) and the assertive (free spirit). 
Negative liberty is valued as being the condition for the development and assertion of the 
free spirit.48 Mill valued freedom for its contribution to autonomy and to the realization of 
the higher potential of the individual. Liberty is desired as part of happiness and is 
consequently a component of that end, as well as a means to it. It is a means to reason, 
and the midwife of individuality which enables the pursuit of what we consider to be good. 
In turn, liberty also contributes to the development of civilization; for without it, progress is 
impossible. Mill explained that this principle applied only to "human beings in the maturity 
of their faculties,” not to children or to barbarians.49 
                                                 
45 Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government, 90. 
46 Ibid., 114. 
47 Ibid., 152. 
48 Mill, ‘Law and Libel and Liberty of the Press’, in Geraint L. Williams (ed.), John Stuart Mill on Politics and 
Society (Glasgow: Fontana, 1976); G.L. Williams, ‘Mill’s Principle of Liberty’, Political Studies XXIV (1976), 
132-40. 
49 J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government, 73.  
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 Mill emphasized that society has a case for interference when a certain conduct is 
intended to inflict harm upon other person. In his unequivocal phrasing, Mill advocated 
"[T]hat the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”50 Interference, then, 
may be justified if the conduct to be deterred is harmful to others, or, to put it differently, if 
the end is self-protection. Mill used the terms 'harmful', 'hurtful', 'injure', and 'cause evil' 
interchangeably.  
 In turn, truth is conducive to happiness because most people do not feel 
comfortable living in a lie. Mill emphasized the quest for truth which is both an important as 
well as an expedient endeavor.51 Only truth freely gained and freely held is of value. Truth 
is the keystone of Mill’s plea for liberty of thought and expression, and it is also of salient 
importance in his discussion of liberty of action. Mill explained that every opinion should be 
checked against experience. When opinion is verified by experience and observation, then 
we have sufficient grounds for holding it to be true. This, of course, does not guarantee 
that it is true. One can never be sure that the truth in one's possession is the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth. This is especially true for the realm of religion and 
spiritual beliefs as one should not make one’s own belief a trump card to subdue other 
beliefs. We can never be sure where the truth lies, hence all our answers must be 
tentative: a universal, single truth is not, and cannot be found.  
                                                 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid, especially chapter 2. 
Authors' accepted manuscript of article which has been published in: Philosophy, 2017, v.92, issue 4. This article has been published 
in a revised form in Philosophy http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0031819117000213. This version is free to view and download for 
private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 
2017. 18 
 
 According to Mill, we can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavouring to 
stifle is a false one; and even if we were to be sure, stifling it would still be an evil.52 False 
opinions are to be tolerated for the sake of the true, for it is impossible to draw any clear 
line that would distinguish between true and false views: "If even the Newtonian 
philosophy were not permitted to be questioned, mankind could not feel as complete 
assurance of its truth as they now do”.53 We should always question common beliefs 
which are held as "truths", for truth is an ideal that we should continue to test and reaffirm.  
 The argument for truth is essentially an argument against coercion. Mill opined: 
“whatever might be the evils of freedom, they could not be worse than the evils of 
restraint.”54 Mill feared equally the tyranny of a minority, and the tyranny of the majority. 
Both startled him. He was keenly aware of the government’s tendencies to abuse its 
                                                 
52 Ibid., 79. 
53 Ibid., 83. For discussion and critique of the Truth Principle, see Maurice Cowling, Mill and Liberalism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963); Geoffrey Marshall, Constitutional Theory (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1971); Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982: 27-34); Kent Greenawalt, Speech, Crime and the Uses of Language 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1989: 16-26); Irene M. Ten Cate, ‘Speech, Truth, and Freedom: An 
Examination of John Stuart Mill's and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's Free Speech Defenses’, Yale 
Journal of Law & the Humanities, 22 (1), Article 2 (2010), 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol22/iss1/2; Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2005: 8-14), and Barendt ‘Thoughts on A Thinker-based Approach to Freedom of Speech’ (in 
writing). 
54 Mill, ‘Law and Libel and Liberty of the Press’, 150. See also R. Cohen-Almagor, ‘Why Tolerate? 
Reflections on the Millian Truth Principle’, Philosophia 25 (1-4) (1997), 131-152.  
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power and, at the same time, feared the tyranny of the masses. The public, through the 
development of democratic agencies, might exhibit intolerance to some out-of-favor 
opinions. Discrimination against views would limit public discourse and people’s ability to 
promote their views through disputation with other, rival opinions. Instead of investing in 
consolidating opinions and elucidating thinking, people might resort to the option of stifling 
opinions. And censorship alarmed Mill. Any form of coercion qua coercion was repugnant.  
Two crucial considerations for advocating the Truth Principle were offered: The 
infallibility and the vitality arguments. The infallibility argument is based on the 
assumptions that (1) there are beliefs which admit of, or have a claim to holding of the 
truth, in areas which it is impossible to hold with certainty any belief to be true; and that 
(2) any intolerance of opinions involves, ipso facto, a claim to infallible knowledge.55 
Even those opinions which we are confident in their truthfulness, such as "Newtonian 
philosophy", must be exposed to scrutiny and doubts.56  Those who assume that they 
know what the truth is provide reasons against pursuing a constant inquiry and debate, 
which deprive humanity of exploring further truths, with the result of inserting sticks in 
the wheels of progress. Thus Mill wrote: "If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, 
and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in 
                                                 
55 For critique of the Infallibility Argument, see Alan Haworth, “On Mill, Infallibility, and Freedom of 
Expression”, in Glen Newey (ed.), Freedom of Expression: Counting the Costs (Newcastle: Cambridge 
Scholars Publishing, 2007), 168-190, at 170-177. 
56J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government, 83. 
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silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing 
mankind."57 
It was not for the sake of the dissenter that Mill denied the right of society to 
silence her, but rather for the sake of truth and progress. Silencing of an opinion is 
resembled to "robbing the human race".58 Mill urged this argument in support of his 
demand for tolerance in the spheres of politics, morality, religion, and taste, spheres 
that are frequently invaded by intolerance.  
In turn, the vitality argument suggests that without free exchange of ideas the 
common views would be rigid, lack adaptability, and soon turn into a dead dogma. 
However true an opinion may be, if it is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, it 
will cease to be held as a "living truth".59 Mill warned against the despotism of custom. In 
other words, it is not only important to hold true beliefs but also to have clear 
understanding of these beliefs, being cognizant of the reasons for holding them. Religion 
without reflection might become a coercive force upheld by believers who are not open to 
dispute and debate. Social pressures and fashionable modes of thinking inhibit thought 
and opinion. This combative attitude toward other beliefs closes the mind, and stifles 
knowledge and understanding of religion rather than enhancing its contributing powers. 
Consequently matters of belief will be held as a closed, persistent dogma. This would 
alienate people, disserve religion, undermine liberty, and infringe the pursuit of truth. 
                                                 
57 Ibid, 79. 
58 Ibid. 
59 J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government, 95. 
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Although acknowledging the fact that, indeed, "the dictum that truth always 
triumphs over persecution is one of those pleasant falsehoods which men repeat after 
one another till they pass into commonplaces, but which all experience refutes",60 Mill 
reasoned that free and open discussion is bound to bring about truth. In a somewhat 
similar way to Adam Smith's belief in the "invisible hand" function in regulating the 
economic powers of the market, Mill believed in such a "hand" which regulates the 
"market-place of ideas", leading to the discovery of truth. Truth in the long run never 
fails to prevail over error: it may be extinguished once, twice, or many times, but in the 
course of the ages there will generally be found persons to rediscover it. 
This process of challenging common beliefs is so vital for revealing the truth that 
Mill was willing to invent artificial opinions to challenge the prevailing ones: "So essential is 
this discipline to a real understanding of moral and human subjects, that if opponents of all 
important truths do not exist, it is indispensable to imagine them, and supply them with the 
strongest arguments which the most skilful devil's advocate can conjure up".61 Mill even 
went so far as to argue that "the well-being of mankind may almost be measured by the 
number and gravity of the truths which have reached the point of being uncontested".62 
Contestation is important to maintain the vitality of beliefs. 
Three important observations are warranted. First, it is only because we allow 
free speech that we are able to entertain some provisional truths as a basis for taking 
decisions or formulating legislation. We have the freedom to contest such truths and to 
                                                 
60 Ibid., 89. 
61 Ibid., 97-98. 
62 Ibid., 103. 
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replace them at will.63 Second, it is not simply having true beliefs that Mill valued but it is 
the way in which the truth is held. People are not like sheep.64 He valued holding beliefs 
that were formed by employing one’s rationality, with knowledge and awareness of the 
significance of these opinions and the grounds for holding them. Mill also appreciated 
the willingness to change beliefs in light of new argument and evidence. Without 
knowing the grounds of an opinion, that opinion “abides as a prejudice, a belief 
independent of, and proof against, argument – this is not the way in which truth ought to 
be held by a rational being. This is not-knowing the truth. Truth, thus held, is but one 
superstition the more, accidentally clinging to the words which enunciate a truth.”65 
Third, Mill dreaded indoctrination or lack of reflection as it inhibits progress.66 
Progress of mankind depends on the development of individuality, through liberties 
                                                 
63 Geoffrey Marshall, Constitutional Theory; R. Cohen-Almagor, ‘John Stuart Mill’, in Clifford G. Christians 
and John C. Merrill (eds.), Ethical Communication: Five Moral Stances in Human Dialogue (Columbia, 
MO.: University of Missouri Press, 2009), 25-32. 
64 J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government, 125. 
65 Ibid., 96. For further discussion, see Gray, Mill on Liberty; C.L. Ten, Mill on Liberty (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1980), 124-143; H.J. McCloskey, John Stuart Mill: A Critical Study (London: Macmillan, 1971), 
118-30; Manley H. Thompson, ‘J.S. Mill’s Theory of Truth: A Study in Metaphysics and Logic’, The 
Philosophical Review LVI (3) (May 1947), 273-92. 
66 In his 1832 essay “On Genius”, 1832 (in John M. Robson [ed.], John Stuart Mill, The Collected Works of 
John Stuart Mill, Volume I - Autobiography and Literary Essays, http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/mill-the-
collected-works-of-john-stuart-mill-volume-i-autobiography-and-literary-essays), Mill asserted that it is the 
duty of all people to seek to know the truth and that they should not be satisfied with accepting it on trust: “Let 
each person be made to feel that in other things he may believe upon trust – if he find a trustworthy authority 
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enjoyed by every person. Social progress should be achieved only through individuality 
and the pursuit of Truth. In Chapter 3 Mill writes that when a person’s conduct is ruled not 
by his character but by “the traditions or customs of other people,” one of the “principal 
ingredients of human happiness, and quite the chief ingredient of individual and social 
progress” is lacking.”67 The love of liberty and the love of improvement are progressive. 
Progress is a continuous process. Writing to Carlyle in 1834, Mill asserted: "Though I hold 
the good of the species... to be the ultimate end,... I believe with the fullest belief that this 
end can in no other way be forwarded but by... each taking for his exclusive aim the 
development of what is best in himself".68  
 
The Millian Boundaries to Free Expression 
My focus is with On Liberty, where Mill wished to establish as far as possible unlimited 
freedom of speech, arguing as a general rule that it should not be subjected to state 
interference or control.69 Nevertheless, Mill did not say that any form of expression ought 
                                                                                                                                                             
– but that in the line of his peculiar duty, and in the line of the duties common to all men, it is his business to 
know”. For further discussion, see J.B. Schneewind (ed.), Mill’s Essays on Literature and Society (New 
York and London: Collier, 1965): 101.  
67 J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government, 115. 
68 J.S. Mill, “The Letters of J.S. Mill”, in Francis E. Mineka (ed.), The Earlier Letters of J.S. Mill, 1812-1848, 
in Collected Works XII (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/mill-the-
collected-works-of-john-stuart-mill-volume-xii-the-earlier-letters-1812-1848-part-i 
69 In various writings, Mill randomly proposed various limitations on freedom of expression. In ‘Mr. 
O’Connell’s Bill for the Liberty of the Press’, in The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, VI - Essays on 
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to enjoy perfect immunity. Being aware of the fact that expressions are other-regarding, 
and that as such they might inflict evil, Mill did not deny that they may cause harm.  
 Mill explained that when thinking one's activity is directed inwards upon one's 
consciousness and operates solely in the spiritual level, so that there is no reason for 
interference in one's thought; whereas when one advocates ideas, one's activity is directed 
outwards, and no longer exists only in one's private domain, hence it may have a bearing 
on others. Though Mill insisted as a general rule that the harmfulness of utterances was 
not sufficient to warrant their restriction, he did not argue that utterances ought never to be 
restricted. In what he regarded as extreme circumstances, Mill explicitly admitted the 
importance of restraining them. 
                                                                                                                                                             
England, Ireland, and the Empire, http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/mill-the-collected-works-of-john-stuart-mill-
volume-vi-essays-on-england-ireland-and-the-empire/simple#lf0223-06_head_045, Mill (1824) wrote that 
‘we would not permit the press to impute, even truly, acts, however discreditable, which are in their nature 
private. We would not allow the truth of such imputation to be even pleaded in mitigation’.  In ‘Law and 
Libel and Liberty of the Press’, in Geraint L. Williams, ed. John Stuart Mill on Politics and Society (Glasgow: 
Fontana, 1976), 143-169, at 160-161, Mill wrote ‘[T]here is one case, and only one, in which there might 
appear to be some doubts of the propriety of permitting the truth to be told with reserve’. This case involves 
the situation ‘when the truth, without being of any advantage to the public, is calculated to give annoyance to 
private individuals’. This statement cannot be easily reconciled with Mill’s On Liberty. Annoyance in On 
Liberty cannot and should not serve as a yardstick for prohibiting speech. It is far too light justification for 
restricting speech. Mill reiterated time and again the Harm Principle which is much more weighty and 
severe yardstick than mere annoyance. For further discussion, see Joel Feinberg, Freedom and 
Fulfillment: philosophical essays (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992). 
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Mill opened On Liberty by stating that the struggle between liberty and authority 
is common.70 Mill argued for the protection of all opinions, including the most 
unorthodox and false. Silencing such opinions might rob the entire human race because 
many scientific breakthroughs originated in singular minds. Similarly, the expression of 
false views would enhance our understanding of what is true and what is false.71 This is 
one of Mill’s major contributions to the free speech literature. Mill emphasized the 
importance of speech (or discussion) as a matter of ethical conviction, and the freedom 
we are entitled to promote, to preach and to advocate our convictions. 
 Mill dreaded custom, convention, and mediocrity of opinion.72 As an elitist, he 
feared intellectual stagnation, that the people’s mind will go to sleep and then society 
will not be able to attain happiness. Because public opinion usually reflects the 
accepted convention, Mill wished to enable scope for unconventional, original and 
antagonist views.73 They will provoke further exchange and promote further probing, 
pushing people to think more carefully and more thoroughly about issues they take for 
granted without much deliberation. He wrote that people may hold strong beliefs, 
                                                 
70 J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government, 65. 
71 Ibid, 140. 
72 Ibid, 68. 
73 Mill explained that that there should be a great social support for opinions different from those of the 
mass. See ‘M. de Tocqueville on Democracy in America’, in Dissertations and Discussions (NY: Haskell 
House, 1973), II, 1-83, at 73. Mill further elucidated that whenever the multitude are alive to the necessity 
of ‘superior intellect’, they rarely fail to distinguish those who possess it. See ‘Appendix’, in Dissertations 
and Discussions (NY: Haskell House, 1973), I, 467-474, at 470. 
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thinking they are true, but still they need to be ready to contest them.74 Freedom of 
expression is “practically inseparable” from freedom of thought but because it might 
affect other people, it falls under a separate principle.75 Thus, unlike freedom of thought 
which is self-regarding, the Free Speech Principle is not immune to restriction. 
Individuals should be free to hear diversified opinions in order to make their own mind 
but they need not hear each and every opinion. Boundaries need to be outlined. 
 
Instigating assassination of a tyrant 
Expression, according to Mill, is social or other-regarding conduct; thus society has 
legitimate authority to regulate it. Yet it is expedient for society to adopt a broad laissez-
faire policy, with a limited number of exceptions to free expression. The expedient 
exceptions may vary as new social circumstances arise.76 In Chapter 5 of On Liberty, 
Mill wrote that “It is one of the undisputed functions of government to take precautions 
against crime before it has been committed, as well as to detect and punish it 
afterwards.”77 While warning against the potential abuse of power, nevertheless Mill 
argued that the government is duty-bound to prevent crimes before they are committed. 
                                                 
74 J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government, 95. See also J.M. Robson, The 
Improvement of Mankind (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), 182-271; Kateb, ‘The Freedom of 
Worthless and Harmful Speech’, 233-35. 
75 Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government, 75. 
76 Riley, ‘J.S. Mill’s Doctrine of Freedom of Expression’, 149. 
77 Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government, 151. 
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In a footnote at the beginning of Chapter 2 of On Liberty Mill introduced the concept of 
incitement by saying: 
 
It would… be irrelevant and out of place to examine here, whether the 
doctrine of tyrannicide deserves that title. I shall content myself with saying, 
that the subject has been at all times one of the open questions of morals, 
that the act of a private citizen in striking down a criminal, who, by raising 
himself above the law, has placed himself beyond the reach of legal 
punishment or control, has been accounted by whole nations, and by some 
of the best and wisest of men, not a crime, but an act of exalted virtue and 
that, right or wrong, it is not of the nature of assassination but of civil war. As 
such, I hold that the instigation to it, in a specific case, may be a proper 
subject of punishment, but only if an overt act has followed, and at least a 
probable connection can be established between the act and the 
instigation.78 
 
Mill’s choosing to put this restriction on freedom of expression in a footnote is 
revealing. It was not material to the essential points he was making. After all, it does not 
matter whether the opinion is immoral or not. Immorality is not grounds for censorship. 
The important thing for him was to celebrate freedom of expression, not to circumscribe 
it. Precisely because of our awareness of Mill’s intention, his exclusionary treatment of 
                                                 
78 Ibid, 78. 
Authors' accepted manuscript of article which has been published in: Philosophy, 2017, v.92, issue 4. This article has been published 
in a revised form in Philosophy http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0031819117000213. This version is free to view and download for 
private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 
2017. 28 
 
incitement is very important. The essential distinction between "instigation" on the one 
hand, and "advocacy,” “preaching” or "teaching" on the other is that those to whom the 
instigation is addressed must be urged to do something now or in the immediate future, 
rather than merely being urged to believe in something. Advocacy attests to democratic 
deliberation when diverse interests openly compete for a period of time in order to reach 
a decision.79 In instigation the time factor is limited. It is speech closely linked to harmful 
action.  
Mill insisted that instigation would warrant punishment “only if an overt act has 
followed.”80 I wish to offer several observations: first, Mill was studiously agnostic on the 
question of political assassinations. He did not elaborate and clarify when such 
assassinations are warranted. Indeed, on some occasions one may ask why not incite 
to the killing of a tyrant? Are the lives the tyrant is taking worthy less protection than the 
tyrant’s life? If we follow the utilitarian doctrine that Mill had advocated, one would argue 
that if the taking of one life might save the lives of many others who will be put the death 
arbitrarily then possibly such instigation can be justified.  
                                                 
79 Nadia Urbinati, Mill on Democracy: From the Athenian Polis to Representative Government (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2002), 81-82. 
80 Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government, 78. Henry Sidgwick (The Methods of 
Ethics (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981: 478) questioned how from a utilitarian point of view it is possible to 
say broadly that secondary injury to others should be disregarded. For further discussion, see R. 
Wollheim, ‘J.S. Mill and the Limits of State Action’, Social Research 40 (1) (1973), 1-30; Nadia Urbinati, Mill 
on Democracy. 
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Mill did not decide the question whether an act of tyrannicide is immoral and 
deserves punishment; therefore he was not saying that incitement to kill the tyrant is 
necessarily wrong. It might be the right thing to do. According to Mill, an attempt to kill a 
tyrant might be morally justified, in which case incitement to kill the tyrant may even 
deserve praise. 
Let me illustrate. On 20 July 1944 Colonel von Stauffenberg attempted to 
assassinate Adolf Hitler. He placed a bomb in Hitler’s headquarters which exploded 
while Hitler was in the room. Hitler was injured but escaped death. von Stauffenberg did 
not operate alone. He was part of a conspiracy to take over the government by killing 
Hitler and then embark on direct talks with Germany’s enemies to end the war 
(Operation Valkyrie). It is estimated that 4,980 Germans were executed after the July 
Plot.81 To carry such a complicated operation, von Stauffenberg certainly talked to 
others and instigated the killing of the Führer. Was the incitement to murder, and the 
attempt on Hitler’s life, justified? Weighing the pros against the cons of Valkyrie, I 
suggest that von Stauffenberg was justified in inciting Hitler’s assassination and in 
carrying it through. Hitler’s assassination could have brought WWII to an earlier close 
and saved a very significant number of lives, including the lives of hundreds of 
thousands of innocent civilians.82 It is noted that nothing in Mill's utilitarian thinking in 
                                                 
81 Jewish Virtual Library, Resistance in World War II: Operation Valkyrie - The ‘July Plot’ to Assassinate 
Hitler, Jewish Virtual Library, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/julyplot.html 
82 During the summer of 1944, the estimated daily number of persons gassed and burned in Auschwitz-
Birkenau was over 9,000. Holocaust Timeline, 
http://www.historyplace.com/worldwar2/holocaust/timeline.html 
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general and his defense of freedom of speech in particular prevents him from holding 
that assassination is sometimes right. Mill's point is that incitement (or conspiracy) to 
murder can be legitimately prohibited and punished, consistent with his conception of 
freedom of speech. However, the phrasing of the footnote may open the way to diverse 
interpretations as to the legitimacy of very harmful actions, and under what 
circumstances they might be warranted. 
Thus, it is not altogether clear what Mill meant by “overt act.” Did he refer only to 
the overt act of assassination or also to overt acts in planning the assassination, 
notwithstanding whether they materialized to assassination? Mill did not elaborate. 
Consider two scenarios: in the first, suppose that a notable politician was calling to kill 
the tyrant but the tyrant had surrounded himself with many layers of security and 
consequently the co-conspirators backed down of their assassination plan. In the 
second scenario, the co-conspirators pursued the plan but the plan was foiled. In both 
scenarios, the overt act of assassination was not conducted but there were concrete 
plans to carry it out. In the first scenario, the plans did not reach the stage of attempt on 
the tyrant’s life. In the second, the attempt failed. Do they both constitute overt acts to 
sufficiently categorize the speech leading to them as incitement? Is any consequential 
overt act sufficient to describe the motivating speech as incitement? The issue is 
unclear. 
However we decide these questions, punishment for incitement or instigation is 
not legitimate if no “overt act” has followed, or if no clear connection can be established 
between the speech/preaching and an attempted act of killing the tyrant. Why it was 
important for Mill to insist that punishment of the speech should take place only if action 
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follows? Presumably because Mill wished to provide the fullest liberty of professing and 
discussing, as a matter of ethical conviction, any doctrine however immoral it may be. If 
no act follows and/no probable connection can be established, then there is no 
punishment, which makes it clear that expression of opinion remains free. But then 
punishment comes always after the harm is already committed. It will serve only as a 
deterrence, not to prevent the translation of harmful speech into harmful act. Can’t we 
evaluate the essence of speech and be able to discern between advocacy and 
incitement by considering its content, the speaker’s intentions, and the circumstances in 
which the speech was uttered to make the distinction and categorize the given speech 
as incitement notwithstanding whether an overt act was followed? In other words, can 
we say that a given speech constitutes incitement because it might potentially bring 
about harmful consequences? Even if no violence resulted from the speech, there might 
be cases in which we can conclusively deduce that the speech was not merely 
advocating an idea but was inciting violence.  
Lastly, as for the law, Mill simply said that incitement to tyrannicide "may be a 
proper subject of punishment,” not that it always is. On purpose, Mill remained vague on 
the subject without providing us with guidelines when incitement should become subject 
of punishment. Mill either did not fully develop his thoughts on the matter, or did not 
wish to share his thoughts on the matter with the readers as this would lead him away 
from his agenda: making the strongest possible plea for freedom of expression. Either 
way, Mill’s treatment of the question is disappointing. Mill the utilitarian was not an 
absolutist champion of freedom of speech and the question of boundaries is certainly 
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material to the discussion. Thus we are left with one example in the entire book where 
Mill addressed the question of boundaries; the corn dealer example. 
 
The corn dealer 
Mill had shed more light on incitement when considering the example of the greedy corn 
dealer. Here he makes an important contribution in distilling the essence of incitement 
which distinguishes it from advocacy. Mill wrote: 
No one pretends that actions should be as free as opinions. On the contrary, 
even opinions lose their immunity, when the circumstances in which they are 
expressed are such as to constitute their expression a positive instigation to 
some mischievous act. An opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, 
or that private property is robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply 
circulated through the press, but may justly incur punishment when delivered 
orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of a corn-dealer, or 
when handed about among the same mob in the form of a placard. Acts of 
whatever kind, which, without justifiable cause, do harm to others, may be, 
and in the more important cases absolutely require to be, controlled by the 
unfavorable sentiments, and, when needful, by the active interference of 
mankind.83 
 
                                                 
83 Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government, 114. 
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Mill considered as instigation any speech, which is intended (or if not intended 
then at least recklessly uttered) to lead to some mischievous action which is delivered 
under circumstances conducive to the taking of that action. In instances such as the one 
concerning the corn-dealer, it seems that Mill would regard harmful speech as 
incitement irrespective of whether overt harmful action follows.84 Although he did not 
explicitly say that, Mill implied that the intention to lead people to take a harmful action - 
in circumstances likely to mobilize people to take that action - constitutes an incitement. 
This speech is not mere advocacy, discussion or debate voiced as a matter of ethical 
conviction which is protected under Mill's theory. 
Mill in the corn-dealer example implicitly indicated that when an audience has no 
time for careful and rational reflection before it pursues the course of action urged upon 
it, this speech falls outside the protection of the Free Speech Principle, since the people 
are too excited to be responsible for their acts. Mill did not restrict the advocating of 
                                                 
84 My view is close to that of Riley, ‘J.S. Mill’s Doctrine of Freedom of Expression’. A different 
interpretation is offered by Morgan who argues that the Millian corn dealer example falls short of direct, 
unambiguous incitement to commit a violent crime; this is because an opinion that ‘corn-dealers are 
starvers of the poor’ is different from a direct call to murder the corn dealer. Notwithstanding the exact 
wording, the consequences might be similarly harmful. See Glyn Morgan, ‘Mill’s Liberalism, Security and 
Group Defamation’, in Glen Newey (ed.), Freedom of Expression: Counting the Costs, 121-143, at 137. 
One may offer a contrary interpretation insisting that Mill thought that ‘some mischievous act’ must follow 
for expressed opinions to lose their immunity. Thus O’Rourke regards Mill as a free speech absolutist, 
arguing that the right to free expression is absolute according to Mill and that even speech which can be 
regarded as incitement should not be prohibited unless violence occur. See K.C. O’Rourke, John Stuart 
Mill and Freedom of Expression: The genesis of a theory (London: Routledge, 2001), 127. 
Authors' accepted manuscript of article which has been published in: Philosophy, 2017, v.92, issue 4. This article has been published 
in a revised form in Philosophy http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0031819117000213. This version is free to view and download for 
private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 
2017. 34 
 
opinions per se. In the example of the corn-dealer, the harmful results of a breach of the 
peace, disorder, and harm to others were imminent and likely. These considerations 
outweigh the significance of free expression.85   
The Millian single paragraph on the corn dealer became a major guideline for 
liberal democracies for the proscription of incitement. But the corn dealer example is still 
opened for interpretations, especially in light of the advances in technology and the 
proliferation of many media outlets. What considerations should we weigh in deciding 
whether or not a given speech is protected? How should we evaluate the relationship 
and proximity between speech and action? These are difficult questions. 
As for the first question, it is clear from the Millian example that the content of 
speech is of utmost importance. If people were to gather outside the corn dealer’s 
house to thank him for his fair business and to celebrate his kindness, Mill would not 
have called them “mob” and would not regard the celebratory praise as “instigation” 
deserving punishment. Instigation, or incitement, always contains negative expression. 
It is an expression designed to yield harm. Pleasantries are never at issue. Incitement is 
not about “how beautiful you look today,” “it is sunny today” or “this cake is delicious.” 
The content of incitement speech is intended to be harmful, damaging, and conducive 
to violence. It is harmful speech-act, designed to evoke violence. 
The second important consideration is concerned with the circumstances that 
must be conducive to the pursuit of harmful action. In the corn dealer example, Mill 
                                                 
85 Raphael Cohen-Almagor, The Boundaries of Liberty and Tolerance (Gainesville, FL: The University 
Press of Florida, 1994). 
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highlighted that the circumstances constitute the expression “a positive instigation to 
some mischievous act.”86 The same utterance might be inciting to violence in a 
particular set of circumstances and therefore prohibited but it might be legitimate, 
regarded as mere advocacy, in other sets of circumstances. An opinion that corn-
dealers are starvers of the poor constitutes an incitement when uttered to a mob in front 
of the corn-dealer’s house but it might be considered as mere advocacy were it be 
uttered some 400 miles away from the corn-dealer’s house or if the audience is 
composed of the ladies who populate the Windsor tea-rooms on a sunny afternoon. As 
Feinberg suggests, a mob is understood to be a collective person whose passions are 
easily manipulated and whose actions easily maneuvered.87 Actions of an incited mob 
cannot be regarded as voluntary even though the component individuals in it, being free 
persons, are all acting voluntarily on their own responsibility. 
It can also be inferred that Mill had in mind protection from violence. Mill wrote 
that the same opinion that “corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, or that private property 
is robbery,” can be freely published in the press although its consequences might be 
disastrous to the interests of the corn dealer.88 Mill was a champion of freedom of the 
                                                 
86 Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government, 114. 
87 Joel Feinberg, Freedom and Fulfillment, 144. 
88 For further discussion, see Marshall, Constitutional Theory, 156-157; Feinberg, Freedom and 
Fulfillment, 141-144; Gray, Mill on Liberty,  103-10; Daniel Jacobsen, ‘Mill on Liberty, Speech and Free 
Society’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 29 (3) (2000): 276-309, at 286; Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech, 
269-270;  Brink, Mill’s Progressive Principles, 156-172. 
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press in England and also in other parts of the world.89 In the corn dealer example, the 
circumstances make the speech problematic. It should be clear that Mill was not there 
to protect capital interests and selfish gains. Mill wanted to protect the corn dealers from 
violence. He might have had other forms of incitement in mind90 but Mill did not 
explicate other forms of incitement. Mill did suggest that “the liberty of the individual 
must be thus far limited; he must not make himself a nuisance to other people.”91 That 
seems potentially to include more than violence, and may even extend further than non-
violent crimes such as fraud. The issue is open to interpretation and as Mill did not 
elaborate on this matter in On Liberty I opt for a restrictive view of the Harm Principle 
when it relates to speech. This is because Mill’s clear agenda was to champion freedom 
of expression and to protect it. What is clear is that Mill objects to mob activism.92 
                                                 
89 In ‘The French Law Against the Press’, Spectator (19 August 1848), p. 800, in The Collected Works of 
John Stuart Mill, XXV - Newspaper Writings December 1847 - July 1873 Part IV [1847], 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/mill-the-collected-works-of-john-stuart-mill-volume-xxv-newspaper-writings-
part-iv, Mill protested against the decree against the press passed by the French National Assembly of 
France, saying it ‘is one of the most monstrous outrages on the idea of freedom of discussion ever 
committed by the legislature of a country pretending to be free’. If only one set of opinions is to be 
permitted on any significant matter, Mill asked rhetorically, what is the essence of political discussion? 
90 Herb Morris suggests in his remarks on a draft of this paper that Mill ‘surely would have believed that 
incitement to an act of fraud, where fraud was criminalized, could also be prohibited’. 
91 Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government, 114. 
92 For further discussion, see David Lloyd and Paul Thomas, Culture and the State (London: Routledge, 
1998). 
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 Thus the content of the speech and the circumstances are, according to Mill, the 
most important considerations we need to weigh when we debate whether a speech 
should be excluded from the protection of the Free Speech Principle because it incites 
to violence. But are these the only considerations? I suggest that there are two further 
considerations we need to explore – the speaker’s intention, and the manner of 
expression. They might not be as crucial as the content of the speech and the 
circumstances, but they may strengthen our decision whether or not prohibit the speech 
under consideration. 
A speaker who explicitly declares that his aim is to stir violence against his target 
group strengthens our conclusion that the speech constitutes incitement and that it 
should be prohibited. The clear intention to do harm should not be facilitated by 
society’s permission to attack his victim. Jonathan Riley interprets Mill to suggest that 
threatening innocent people with death, severe physical harm or financial ruin can 
rightfully be suppressed by criminal sanctions as well as social stigma. And in assessing 
the speaker’s intention we should consider the speaker’s past conduct towards his 
target group, his connections with organizations that have a history of prejudice and 
violence, and the likelihood that the speech will encourage others to do harm.93 
As for the manner of expression, a charismatic speaker (A) has better chances to 
motivate people into action than someone (B) who is stripped of any charismatic 
qualities and who is likely to be ignored. Both speakers might utter exactly the same 
                                                 
93 Jonathan Riley, ‘Mill, Liberalism, and Exceptions to Free Speech’, in Glen Newey (ed.), Freedom of 
Expression: Counting the Costs (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007), 205. 
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damaging expression but while the audience might be swayed to act on the utterance of 
(A), they might silence (B) because he lacks the motivating powers.  
At the same time, while the content of the speech and the circumstances are 
essential for describing speech as incitement, the speaker’s intention and the manner of 
expression are secondary. Even in their absence we might still prohibit a certain speech 
because it incites violence. This is because not always speakers openly declare their 
harmful expressions, and because the manner of speech might be immaterial to our 
decision. Let me explain. 
Astute politicians who wish to do harm might disguise their intentions and 
motives. This is especially true in democracies that have developed mechanisms of 
self-defense against anti-democratic movements. Thus racist and exclusionary parties 
in contemporary Germany would not describe themselves as Nazi because Nazism is 
outlawed in Germany. Racist organizations would not openly declare that they aim is to 
throw out minorities from the country and to persecute them. Instead they would 
emphasize the need for clearer immigration laws, and speak of the dangers of 
multiculturalism that, so they claim, facilitate terrorism. The utterances might be very 
harmful and damaging but the intentions of the speaker might remain obscure. In 
certain circumstances, when the speech is dangerous and vile, we may decide to 
prohibit the harmful expression notwithstanding whether or not the intention of the 
speaker was made clear. 
Charisma is of vital importance in motivating people into action. But leaders may 
enjoy different forms of charisma, not necessarily verbal. No less important is religious 
charisma. A speaker might lack any oratory qualities and still enjoy powerful ability to 
Authors' accepted manuscript of article which has been published in: Philosophy, 2017, v.92, issue 4. This article has been published 
in a revised form in Philosophy http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0031819117000213. This version is free to view and download for 
private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 
2017. 39 
 
sway people into action. Ayatollah Khomeini might have whispered the fatwa he uttered 
against Salman Rushdie but the manner of expression was absolutely immaterial to its 
impact and did not detract from its seriousness. Sheikh Yassin, the spiritual leader of 
Hamas, was not known for a strong voice yet he was able to persuade dozens of young 
Moslems to become shaheeds (holy martyrs) in launching suicide terror attacks in 
public places in Israel.  
Sometimes, the manner of expression encapsulates content. This is the case of 
symbolic expressions. Thus, when a person arrives in a Jewish neighborhood while he 
dresses as a Nazi, with the symbol of swastika on his arm band, long black boots and 
black clothes he need not say anything. It is clear that his message is one of hate and 
that his intentions are harmful. When a person burns a cross at the lawn of an African-
American family it is clear that his intention is to inflict harm, harass and intimidate the 
family. He need not say anything further. When a person puts a pork head at the 
entrance of a mosque he need not utter a word. His message is one of hatred and 
contempt. Symbolic speeches can be as damaging as other forms of expression. They 
might be morally on a par with physical harm. 
Symbolic expressions can be highly offensive to the target group, and they can 
also incite others to violent actions. Mill was not cognizant of the former, not explicitly at 
any rate. Explicitly Mill was committed to the view that, however offensive an opinion 
may be, this cannot constitute a legitimate ground for its suppression for he wrote: 
“there is no parity between the feeling of a person for his own opinion, and the feeling of 
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another who is offended at his holding it; no more than between the desire of a thief to 
take a purse, and the desire of the right owner to keep it.”94  
But if symbolic expressions might lead to a violent action here or in the 
immediate future, as was the case in Israel in 1995, when a calculated incitement 
campaign was launched by the extreme right against the Oslo Peace Accords and its 
driving force, Prime Minister Rabin, then there can be grounds for some limitations on 
speech. I think Mill would not protect the depiction of the prime minister in Nazi SS 
uniform, as Rabin was depicted. When the prime minister of Israel was depicted as a 
Nazi, that meant he was the prime enemy of Israel with whom one could not make any 
reconciliation. The Nazi agenda dictated annihilation of all Jews, thus the only option left 
was to kill the prime minister before he will destroy “us,” the “true” Jewish-Zionists. The 
incitement campaign led to Rabin’s assassination on 4 November 1995.95 It seems to 
me that Mill would not have tolerated such speech because it facilitated and promoted 
harm and wrong-doing against a specific target. An overt act of assassination 
immediately followed upon this campaign and so the campaign of speech satisfies Mill’s 
                                                 
94 Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government, 140. Eric Barendt noted in his comments 
on a draft of this paper the distinction between insulting speech and offensive speech, arguing that it 
would be wrong to penalize offensive speech, and that freedom of speech must include the freedom to 
publish offensive material. The law has to strike a balance between the tolerance of offensive speech on 
the one hand and on the other the proscription of speech which is insulting and intended or likely to lead 
to violence, disorder and so on.   
95 Michael Karpin and Ira Friedman, Murder in the Name of God (London: Granta Books, 2000); R. 
Cohen-Almagor, The Boundaries of Liberty and Tolerance. 
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necessary condition for regarding it as instigation deserving of punishment. But Mill 
would condone cases like Skokie, where a group of American Nazis wished to march in 
this suburb of Chicago which was populated mainly by Jews, many of whom were 
Holocaust survivors, notwithstanding the offensiveness of the speech as this kind of 
speech does not provoke people to harm others.96 In On Liberty, there is no strong 
evidence that Mill would not have allowed expressions because of their offensive nature 
and their power to inflict significant psychological distress. 
Thus there is a hierarchy between the four criteria for incitement; we need to 
probe all of them but we might reach the conclusion that a certain speech constitutes an 
incitement also when the speaker’s intention is unknown, and when the manner of 
expression is calm and seems lacking the power to motivate power into action. But now 
another question arises: Are there utterances that would be considered inflammatory 
notwithstanding the particular circumstances in which they are uttered? This question 
becomes very important in our age of mass media. 
In 1859, when John Stuart published On Liberty, the press was the main vehicle 
for circulating news. Today, the press is only one of many means to circulate news. The 
media are far more invasive and diffuse. Incitement can be uttered many miles away 
                                                 
96 Aryeh Neier, Defending My Enemy (New York: Dutton, 1979); Joel Feinberg, Offence to Others (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1985); D.A. Downs, Nazis in Skokie (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1985); R. Cohen-Almagor, ‘Harm Principle, Offence Principle, and the Skokie Affair’, 
Political Studies XLI (3) (1993): 453-470; Ivan Hare and James Weinstein (eds.), Extreme Speech and 
Democracy;  Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
2012).  
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from the target group and the media will transmit it to the audience who might act upon 
it. Further, the media might create an atmosphere of incitement against the designated 
target. The media amplify the violent expression, multiply its strength tenfold, and 
inspire more people to adopt violent language. The combination of the press, radio, 
television and Internet (including ample platforms of social media) is extremely powerful 
in conveying messages, positive and negative. The media can mobilize people into 
action. We have seen it time and again in organizing events, demonstrations, petitions, 
charity campaigns, marches, customer initiatives and political campaigns. With such a 
powerful influence, it can be argued that the mob need not be outside the victim’s 
house. The media have the ability to transmit incitement and deliver the violent 
message to many people in many places. Again, prime example is the successful 
incitement campaign against Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. The campaign was 
orchestrated via the mass media, effectively delivering the message that Rabin should 
be killed for his betrayal of Israel, in conceding to give up precious parts of the Holy 
Land in return for an obscure peace that, according to the inciters, was not worth of the 
paper on which it was written.97 The combination of the content of the dangerous 
expressions, its manner, the intentions of the speakers that clearly said “Rabin Should 
Be Killed,” and the circumstances in Israel at large necessitated the restriction of 
incitement. Unfortunately, not enough was done to curtail the well-orchestrated 
incitement campaign which led to Prime Minister Rabin’s assassination.  
                                                 
97 R. Cohen-Almagor, ‘Political Extremism and Incitement in Israel 1993-1995, 2003-2005: A Study of 
Dangerous Expressions’, Democracy and Security 3 (1) (2007), 21-43. 
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 The context of the time is also important. Today the expression “John Doe (the 
Finance Minister) is starving the poor” would most probably be tolerated anywhere, also 
in front of the finance minister’s home. But the statement “John Doe is starving the poor 
and therefore should be killed” is beyond the scope of tolerance anywhere, whether in 
front of his house or many miles away. This is because we take into consideration the 
power of the mass media in facilitating incitement. Indeed, the Internet is awash with 
inciting calls for violence and terrorism whose significance and impact cannot be 
underestimated.98 
 The statement “Jews should be gassed” would have probably been tolerated by 
many American liberals during the 1920s. They would have said: What does it mean 
“should be gassed? It is meaningless. Surely it is impossible to gas all Jews. This is a 
message of hate but it has no consequence. It is like saying “Jews should fly.” But many 
liberals won’t tolerate such a statement today, after the Holocaust. Reality sometimes 
exceeds imagination.  
The peculiarity of cases of instigation is that the likelihood of an immediate danger 
is high, and we have little or no opportunity to conduct a discussion in the open and to 
submit conflicting considerations into play, which may reduce the effects of the speech. 
Justice Oliver W. Holmes argued that in some circumstances, when speech is closely 
related to action and might induce harmful consequences, it should be curtailed. In a way 
similar to the Millian corn-dealer example, Holmes asserted in a renowned opinion that we 
                                                 
98 Alexander Tsesis, ‘Terrorist Speech on Social Media’, Vanderbilt Law Review 70 (2) (2017), 651-708. 
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cannot allow falsely shouting "Fire!" in a crowded theater.99 Here, too, a restriction on 
speech is justified on the grounds that the content of the speech (that is, its effects, not its 
intrinsic value), the manner of the speech, and the intentions of the agent are aimed to 
bring about harm, while the audience dwells under conditions which diminish its ability to 
deliberate in a rational manner. Therefore such a shout might lead it to act in a harmful 
manner (harmful to themselves as well as to others). Hence, to the extent that speech 
entails an immediate effect, the arguments which assign special status to freedom of 
speech are less compelling. Boundaries have to be introduced in accordance with the 
context of the speech, otherwise the results could be too risky. As Zechariah Chafee 
stated: "Smoking is all right, but not in a powder magazine."100 
 
Conclusion 
Mill’s arguments are utilitarian and consequentialist. He was interested in promoting 
liberty because of the social benefits that can be derived from a policy of freedom and 
unlimited access to the discovery of truth. For Mill, the ideas of happiness and progress 
were infused with his concept of individual autonomy.101 His writings should be 
analyzed in light of the spirit of the time, when freedom of speech was privilege, not 
necessarily a right, especially not for the poor strata of society, even more so when 
                                                 
99 Schenck v. U.S. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
100 Zechariah Chafee, Free Speech in the United States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1946), 397.  
101 Alan Ryan, The Philosophy of John Stuart Mill (London: Macmillan, 1970), xi-xx; J.C. Rees, John 
Stuart Mill’s On Liberty (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 77. 
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people raised criticisms against the church. In a society that had limited expressions 
that were deemed blasphemous or offensive to the elite, Mill felt the need to endorse 
the widest possible scope to freedom of expression and of the press. This was his clear 
agenda. 
Rather than Mill's protection of free speech being boundless, it is argued that 
different considerations must apply in different contexts. In the context of Nazi 
Germany, instigating the assassination of Hitler is not just justified but morally 
praiseworthy. By contrast, in Israel, instigating the assassination of the Prime Minister, 
even using implicit and indirect symbolic means, is not justified and legitimately subject 
to prohibition. 
 Because Mill wished to be a champion for free expression, his treatment of the 
exceptions to free speech is unsystematic and incomplete. It opens a scope for 
interpretations. In this essay I offered one more interpretation, and critique, of the Millian 
principles. While admiring Mill’s achievement in influencing many scholars and courts in 
different corners of the globe, at the same time I find it regrettable that Mill did not 
elaborate in his writings on the issue of appropriate boundaries to freedom of 
expression in On Liberty or in his later writings. But maybe this is what Mill wanted: to 
open an ongoing debate in which many stakeholders express an opinion, in the fashion 
that Mill promoted with the formulation of the Truth Principle, aiming to reach some 
truth, only to be contested and challenged until another consensus is reached, and yet 
again until the next challenge. In this respect, we follow the Millian tradition and 
implement what Mill had preached. Mill should be pleased. 
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